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Abstract
How does the minimum wage affect crime rates? Empirical research suggests that increasing a
worker’s wage can deter him from committing crimes. On the other hand, if that worker becomes
displaced as a result of the minimum wage, he may be more likely to commit a crime. In this
paper, I describe a frictional world in which a worker’s criminal actions are linked to his labor market
outcomes. The model is calibrated to match labor market outcomes and crime decisions of workers
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997, and shows that the relationship between the
aggregate crime rate and the minimum wage is U-shaped. The results from the calibrated model, as
well as empirical evidence from county level crime data and state level minimum wage changes from
1995 to 2014, suggest that the crime minimizing minimum to median wage ratio for 16 to 19 year olds
is 0.91. However, the welfare maximizing minimum to median wage ratio is 0.87, not equal to the
crime minimizing value. The median wage of 16 to 19 year olds in the United States in 2018 was $10,
suggesting that any federal minimum wage increase up to $8.70 may be welfare improving.
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1 Introduction
The minimum wage has once again made it to the front lines of political discussion in the United
States. Both the Democratic and Republican Party have come out in favor of substantial increases. An
unprecedented number of cities have proposed legislation for higher local minimum wages and for the
first time ever, a majority of states have minimum wages higher than the federal level. California and
New York City have passed laws raising the minimum wage to $15 within a few years, bringing about
some of the largest real increases since 1949. Economists have long debated the labor market effects
of a minimum wage, dating back to Stigler (1946) who first drew attention to possible employment
effects after a 21% erosion of the real wage floor induced a public outcry for a higher minimum. While
nearly all of the arguments hinge on employment, in this paper I ask how changes in the minimumwage
affect criminal activity. Given that the policy is primarily aimed at improving labor market conditions
for young and unskilled workers, who are also most at risk in terms of criminal activity, see Figure 1,
potential changes in crime should be part of the policy debate.
Figure 1: Characteristics of Minimum Wage Workers and Criminals
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Notes: Plotted in blue is the percent distribution of hourly workers working at or below the minimum wage by age
in 2012. The data come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Characteristics of Minimum Wage Workers Report.
Plotted in green is the percent distribution of arrests for Type 1 Property Crimes as defined by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) by age in 2012. The data come from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports.
Many economists have tested how the decision to commit crimes changes with respect to the
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probability or severity of punishment.1 However, it was not until Schmidt and Witte (1984) and
Grogger (1998) that they began to test the effects of labor market changes on people’s criminal actions.
The conclusions drawn by these studies are as economic theory suggests: people choose to commit
more crimes when unemployment increases and less when they receive higher wages.2 Therefore,
economic theory alone can not determine how an increase in the minimum wage will affect the crime
rate. Increasing the minimum wage can raise wages for workers, thus deterring them from crime.
However, there exists empirical evidence that the minimum wage will displace some workers from
jobs,3 thus enticing them to commit more crimes. The employment effects from the minimum wage
on specifically teen employment (the focus of this paper) is mixed; Allegretto et al. (2010) find no
significant employment effects and Neumark et al. (2014) find significant employment effects on teens
with estimated elasticities around−0.3. Although the literature ismixed, I show that themodel presented
below exhibits small employment effects, similar to those estimated in the empirical literature.
To find the direction of the effect, I use a search-theoretic framework to describe a world in which
people make crime and labor market decisions jointly. I calibrate themodel to match aggregate statistics
of crime and the labor market to analyze the quantitative implications of changing the minimum wage.
The existing literature trying to identify and quantify the effect of the minimum wage on crime rates is
sparse. Hashimoto (1987) finds evidence of a positive relationship using national time-series data of the
minimum wage and teenage arrest rates relative to adults.4 In a recent micro-level study, Beauchamp
and Chan (2014) find a positive effect of minimum wage increases on crime for people employed at a
binding wage. I analyze a setting in which the minimum wage can change all workers’ crime decisions
and examine the effect on the aggregate crime rate. Both increased schooling and work have been
proposed as methods for reducing youth crime rates. Grogger (1998) finds the elasticity of crime with
respect to wages for teens to be −0.18 while Lochner and Moretti (2004) find that an increase in one
year of schooling decreases teen arrest rates by 0.1−0.3 implying similar returns. Therefore, increasing
the minimum wage could be a policy tool that is as effective as education for decreasing teen crime
rates, as long as the negative employment effects are outweighed by the wage effects. To effectively
implement the minimum wage as a policy tool for deterring teens from crime it is crucial to know for
what level of minimum wage each effect dominates, which is, the goal of this paper.
1See for example: Becker (1968); Ehrlich (1973); Myers (1983); Grogger (1991); Owens (2009); Hansen (2015)
2For more recent literature reaffirming these results see Gould et al. (2002), Naci and Bulent (2017), Machin and Hansen
(2003) and Schnepel (2014) for estimates of the elasticity of crime with respect to wages and Gould et al. (2002), Corman and
Mocan (2005) and Lin (2008) for estimates of an elasticity of crime with respect to unemployment.
3See Neumark and Wascher (2007) for a review of how changes in the minimum wage affect labor market conditions. For
new evidence from the Seattle minimum wage increases see Jardim et al. (2017).
4Hashimoto (1987) is limited by the use of national data whichmay lose much of its identifying variation through aggregation
and is subject to spurious correlations.
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The basic structure of the model is as follows: in the labor market, workers receive job offers at an
exogenous rate and wages are determined by strategic bargaining between workers and firms. Workers
are heterogeneous in ability, which influences their labor market outcomes; heterogeneity among
workers is essential for analyzing the effects of a minimum wage policy on labor market outcomes,
since not all workers are affected equally.5 For the minimumwage to have positive welfare effects, firms
must have some monopsony power; search frictions and match specific productivity create monopsony
power for the firms, which shifts the gains from trade toward the firm. In the model, the minimum wage
will act as a policy tool that can be used to shift some of the gains from trade back to the worker.
The crime market is as in Burdett et al. (2003); workers receive random crime opportunities while
employed and unemployed. I add two levels of heterogeneity to capture two important interactions
between changes in the labor market and the crime market. First, in contrast to other models of crime
and the labor market, workers are ex-ante heterogeneous in ability, making the stock of criminals
endogenous and allowing changes in the labor market to have an extensive effect on crime. This
extensive effect is also modeled in Huang et al. (2004), where workers specialize in criminal activities,
however among those that commit crimes, their propensity for criminal behavior is identical. In
contrast, in Burdett et al. (2003) all workers are criminals and have the same propensity for criminal
behavior, therefore changes in labor market conditions will not have an extensive effect on crime. In
Engelhardt et al. (2008) all workers commit crimes with propensities differing across employment
states, again changes in labor market conditions will not have an extensive effect on crime as everyone
is a criminal. Second, matches are ex-post heterogeneous with respect to productivity, allowing the
“quality” of a job to enter into the worker’s crime decision, and creating a range of wages for which
he commits crimes, in contrast to a single criminal wage as in Burdett et al. (2003) and Burdett et al.
(2004). Therefore, changes in labor market outcomes can have an intensive effect on crime, changing
the propensity for criminal behavior differentially across individuals. Including this intensive effect on
crime creates the wage effect: when the minimum wage increases, wages increase and the criminal
propensity for those committing crimes while employed decreases. In the model, the minimum wage
will also act as a policy tool used to deter workers from crime and decrease the prison population.
Indeed, the minimum wage has multiple roles, lessening the effects of monopsony power, as well as
deterring the worker from crime. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to investigate both
roles in a general equilibrium model.
Using the benchmarkmodel, I introduce aminimumwage by imposing a constraint on the bargaining
problem faced by firms and workers. The model is calibrated to match the crime decisions and labor
5Meyer and Wise (1983a) and Meyer and Wise (1983b) provide evidence of heterogeneities by showing that the effect of a
minimum wage on employment and earnings differs across the group of workers for which it is binding.
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market outcomes of 16-19 year olds from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 in 1998. I
vet the model by simulating data and estimating the elasticity of crime with respect to wages and the
elasticity of employmentwith respect to theminimumwage, finding that themodel generated elasticities,
although not targeted in the calibration, are similar to those found in the empirical literature. Increasing
theminimumwagewithin the calibratedmodel reveals a non-monotomic, U-shape relationship between
the minimum wage and the crime rate. The results from the calibrated model and empirical evidence
from county level crime data and state level minimum wage changes from 1995 to 2014 suggest that the
crime minimizing minimum to median wage ratio for 16-19 year olds is 0.91. However, welfare is not
maximized when crime is minimized. The welfare maximizing minimum to median wage ratio is 0.87,
which leaves crime at 0.02 crimes per person per month higher than the crime minimizing minimum to
median wage ratio. If policymakers abstract from the effect of a minimum wage on crime, the welfare
maximizing minimum to median wage ratio is 0.7.
The median nominal wage of all 16 to 19 year old across the United Stated in 2018 was $10. The
model implies that the crime minimizing nominal minimum wage is $9.10 and the welfare maximizing
nominal minimum wage is $8.70 in 2018. Both values are above the current nominal federal minimum
wage of $7.25, suggesting that when taking changes in crime into consideration, a federal increase in
the minimum wage may be welfare improving. However, the median wage for 16 to 19 year olds in
2018 in California was $11.10, implying that without substantial real wage growth for young workers,
the impending minimum wage increase toward $15, may be welfare reducing and may increase crime
rates within the state. Flinn (2006) also attempts to find a welfare maximizing minimumwage, however,
ignoring the impact on individuals’ crime decisions. The welfare maximizing nominal minimum wage
in 1997 that Flinn (2006) estimates is $3.36 per hour. The median nominal wage of 16 to 19 year olds in
1997 was $6.36; the model presented in this paper implies the welfare maximizing nominal minimum
wage in 1997 was $5.53. The difference between the welfare maximizing minimum wage estimated by
Flinn (2006) and the model proposed in this paper is consistent with the result that ignoring the effects
of a minimum wage on individuals’ crime decisions leads policymakers to underestimate the optimal
minimum wage.
2 Model
To begin, I describe a world in which people in the labor market receive both exogenous job and crime
opportunities and show how they jointly decide whether or not to take a job or act on the opportunity
to commit a crime in the absence of a binding minimum wage. The question of interest is: how does
a binding minimum wage change the behavior of a worker? How does it change his decision to accept
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jobs and act on crime opportunities, and in turn how do these changes translate into the aggregate
crime rate? To answer these questions, I introduce a minimum wage into the model as a constraint that
workers and firms must consider when bargaining over the wage. Using the theoretical framework, I
analyze how the existence of such a constraint changes employment decisions and subsequently wages,
as well as the crime decisions of employed and unemployed workers.
2.1 Workers
The model is in continuous time and composed of a unit measure of workers, who: are risk neutral,
discount at rate r , and are ex-ante heterogeneous in their ability, a, given by the c.d.f. F(a). There
exists an exogenous distribution of jobs of productivity λ with c.d.f. G(λ). While unemployed, a
worker receives flow utility b and matches with a job at exogenous rate µj . When a worker of ability
a matches with a job of productivity λ the total productivity of the match is aλ.6 Wages for the match
are determined by strategic bargaining à la Rubinstein’s alternating offers, discussed in detail below,
and workers separate from jobs at exogenous rate δ.
Workers also receive opportunities to commit crimes at rate µu while unemployed and µe while
employed. If the worker receives a crime opportunity he has the chance to steal some fixed amount g.
If a worker commits a crime, the probability he is caught and sent to jail is pi. The decision to act on
a crime opportunity is based on the expected cost and expected utility of committing the crime. Given
the probability is zero that a worker simultaneously receives the opportunity to commit a crime or take
a job, the expected utility of committing a crime while unemployed, Ku(a), is equal to the instantaneous
gain from committing the crime, g, and the weighted average of his continued state: his prison utility if
he is caught or his unemployment utility if he is not. The expected utility of committing a crime while
employed, Ke(a, λ), is calculated analogously. Therefore,
Ku(a) = g + piVp(a) + (1 − pi)Vu(a) (1)
Ke(a, λ) = g + piVp(a) + (1 − pi)Ve(a, λ) (2)
where, Vp(a) is the value of prison, Vu(a) is the value of unemployment, and Ve(a, λ) is the value of
being employed at a job with productivity λ, all defined below. Workers commit crimes rationally; if
the expected gain (Ku(a) − Vu(a)) of committing the crime is greater than zero a worker will choose
to act on the opportunity. Given a crime opportunity, let φu(a) and φe(a, λ) be the probability that
a worker commits a crime while unemployed and employed at a job of productivity λ. The crime
6This assumption is similar to Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Cahuc et al. (2006) who estimate the productivity of a
match to have a firm and individual component.
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decisions for an unemployed and an employed worker are:
φu(a) =
{
1 if g + pi(Vp(a) − Vu(a)) > 0
0 if g + pi(Vp(a) − Vu(a)) ≤ 0, (3)
φe(a, λ) =
{
1 if g + pi(Vp(a) − Ve(a, λ)) > 0
0 if g + pi(Vp(a) − Ve(a, λ)) ≤ 0. (4)
Both employed and unemployed workers can be victims of crime at rate χ; victims of crime suffer
a loss of L. The flow return to being unemployed for a worker of ability a, rVu(a), is equal to the flow
utility of unemployment times the worker’s ability7, net of being a victim of crime plus the expected
value of receiving either a crime or job opportunity:
rVu(a) = ab − χL + µuφu(a)[Ku(a) − Vu(a)] + µj
∫
λ
max{Ve(a, λ) − Vu(a), 0} dG(λ) (5)
Similarly, the flow return of employment for a worker of ability a employed at a jobwith productivity
λ is:
rVe(λ, a) = w(a, λ) − χL + µeφe(a, λ)[Ke(a, λ) − Ve(a, λ)] + δ[Vu(a) − Ve(a, λ)] (6)
wherew(a, λ) is the wage paid to the worker. Workers in prison receive flow value z and are exogenously
released at rate γ. All workers released from prison are released into unemployment. The flow return
of prison is:
rVp(a) = z + γ(Vu(a) − Vp(a)). (7)
Notice in Equation 3 that the crime decision of an unemployed worker is only a function of his
ability. Therefore, there exists a unique value of unemployment that makes workers indifferent to
committing crimes while unemployed:
Vu(a)∗ = g(r + γ)rpi +
z
r
. (8)
If Vu(a) < Vu(a)∗, the worker will commit crimes while unemployed and if Vu(a) ≥ Vu(a)∗ he will not.
Since Vu(a) is strictly increasing in a, there exists a unique ability, a∗, such that Vu(a∗) = Vu(a)∗, and
workers with ability a < a∗ commit crimes while unemployed, while workers with ability a ≥ a∗ do
not. Proposition 2.1 proves that workers who do not commit crimes while unemployed also forgo crime
opportunities while employed. Since workers with ability greater than a∗ will never commit crimes,
F(a∗) can be thought of as the stock of criminals in the economy.
7This assumption is similar to those made in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Flinn and Mullins (2015).
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Proposition 2.1. If a ≥ a∗ then φe(a, λ) = 0 for all λ ≥ λR(a). Where λR(a) is the worker’s reservation
job productivity defined as Ve(a, λR(a)) = Vu(a).
Proof. See proof in Appendix section A.1. □
2.2 Jobs
There exists a continuum of firms that randomly meet workers. After a firm meets a worker, the firm
observes the productivity of the job, λ, and the ability of the worker, a. The value of a successful match
with a worker of ability a, a job productivity λ, and a wage w is:
J(w, a, λ) = aλ − w
r + δ + µeφe(a, λ)pi . (9)
Notice that the expected duration of the job depends on the worker’s decision to commit crimes while
employed. If the worker chooses to commit crimes while employed the job can end with him getting
caught and going to prison. If the match is not successful the worker and firm part ways, in which case
the firm receives a payoff of zero.
For tractability of the model, I do not explicitly model the matching process. The worker only cares
about the probability of a successful match, that is, the probability of meeting a firm, µj , times the
probability that the total job productivity is above his reservation wage. With the implementation of a
binding minimum wage, the meeting probability remains fixed, however the probability that the match
is successful now hinges on whether the total job productivity is above the value of the minimum wage.
Thus as the minimum wage increases, the job finding rate for the worker decreases. The elasticity of
employment with respect to the minimum wage is important for answering the question at hand since
it determines, in part, the unemployment effect on crime. The assumption that the meeting probability,
µj , remains fixed with an increase in the minimum wage is consistent with Flinn (2006) who can not
reject that the meeting probability does not change with an increase in the minimumwage from $4.75 to
$5.15 in 1997. Although the meeting probability is fixed with respect to the minimum wage, I show in
Subsection 5.1 that the model matches the empirically estimated elasticity of employment with respect
to the minimum wage well.
2.3 Wages
As noted by Engelhardt et al. (2008), when the worker can choose to commit crimes while employed,
the feasible set of allocations that split the surplus of the match is non-convex, therefore the axiomatic
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approach to bargaining cannot be implemented.8 I choose to split the surplus through strategic
bargaining: the worker and the firm determine the wage in a two stage game à la Rubinstein’s alternating
offers.
In the first stage the firm offers the worker a wage. If he accepts the offer, bargaining ends and the
job begins at the offered wage. If he rejects the wage the game moves to the second stage where he gets
to set the final wage with probability β and the firm gets to set the final wage with probability 1 − β.
The probability that the match breaks up during negotiations is zero and neither the firm nor the worker
discount the future during the bargaining process.
At this point it is simplest to rewrite the value of employment as a function of the worker’s ability
and the wage instead of the worker’s ability and the productivity of the job; let Ve(w(a, λ), a) denote
the value of employment for a worker of ability a employed at a job of productivity λ which pays
wage w(a, λ). There are two wages that are of particular interest. First, the reservation wage, wR(a)9,
defined as Vu = Ve(wR(a), a) such that if w ≥ wR(a) the worker chooses to stop searching and accept
the job. By the value of unemployment, Equation 6, and the fact that a worker who chooses not to
commit crimes while unemployed, will never commit a crime while employed (Proposition 2.1), the
reservation wage is
wR(a) =

χL + rVu(a) − µe
[
g + pi
(
z−rVu (a)
r+γ
)]
if Vu(a) < Vu(a)∗
χL + rVu(a) if Vu(a) ≥ Vu(a)∗.
(10)
The secondwage of interest is the crime reservationwage, wC(a) defined as g+pi[Vp−Ve(wC(a), a)] = 0
such that if w ≥ wC(a) the worker chooses to stop searching, accept the job, and does not commit
crimes while employed.10 Again, using the value of unemployment, Equation 6, one can solve for the
crime reservation wage:
wC(a) = χL + r(r + δ)r + γ Vu(a)
∗ +
r(γ − δ)
r + γ
Vu(a) (11)
for Vu(a) < Vu(a)∗. Workers that do not commit crimes while unemployed do not have a crime
reservation wage since they forgo crime opportunities for all wages.
Equilibrium wages can be found by solving the two stage game through backwards induction, first
solving the optimal wage offers in the second stage for the worker and the firm, then solving for the
firm’s optimal offer in the first stage, given the second stage outcomes. In the first stage the firm offers
8The problem is similar to that of on the job search, see Shimer (2006) for details.
9I have suppressed the job productivity value since workers only care about the wage they receive, not the productivity of
the job.
10I will assume that workers are moral, such that a worker indifferent to committing crimes will choose not to commit crimes.
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the profit maximizing wage, subject to the worker accepting the offer. Therefore, in equilibrium wages
will be determined without delay.
In the second stage, if a worker of ability a gets to set the final wage he will choose to set the wage
equal to the total productivity of the match, w = aλ, thus taking the entire surplus of the match. If the
worker is a criminal, then he continues to commit crimes while employed if aλ < wC(a) and forgoes
crime if aλ ≥ wC(a). If the firm matches with a criminal and gets to set the final wage in the second
stage, the firm must choose between setting the wage at the reservation wage or setting the wage at the
crime reservation wage. So for Vu(a) < Vu(a)∗, the firm faces the following problem in the second
stage:
w(a, λ) = argmax
{wR,wC }
{
aλ − wR(a)
r + δ + µepi
,
aλ − wC(a)
r + δ
}
(12)
It is easy to show that wR(a) < wC(a), therefore the firm faces a trade off between receiving a higher
flow value for the job for a shorter expected duration, or a lower flow value for the job for a longer
expected duration. Problem (12) has a unique solution for the job productivity that equates the two
choices, call it λD2(a):
λD2(a) = (r + δ + µepi)wC(a) − (r + δ)wR(a)
aµepi
. (13)
If λ < λD2(a) the firm sets the wage wR(a) and if λ ≥ λD2(a) then the firm sets the wage wC(a) in the
second stage. If the firm matches with a non-criminal, Vu(a) ≥ Vu(a)∗, then it has no choice to make
and it sets the wage to the workers reservation wage, wR(a).
In the first stage the firm chooses to offer the wage that maximizes profits subject to the worker
accepting the offer. The worker will accept the offer if it is at least as large as his expected value of the
second stage. For non-criminals, the expected value of the second stage is:
βVe(aλ, a) + (1 − β)Ve(wR(a), a)
= β
[
aλ − χL + δVu(a)
r + δ
]
+ (1 − β)
[
wR(a) − χ + δVu(a)
r + δ
]
=
βaλ + (1 − β)wR(a) − χL + δVu(a)
r + δ
(14)
= Ve(βaλ + (1 − β)wR(a), a)
since the value of employment for non-criminals is linear in the wage. For non-criminals the firm must
offer a wage at least as large as the expected wage in the second stage, so the firm faces the following
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problem in the first stage:
w(a, λ) = argmax
w
aλ − w
r + δ
s.t. w ≥ βaλ + (1 − β)wR(a). (15)
Therefore, the firm offers wage w(a, λ) = βaλ+ (1− β)wR(a) whenever Vu(a) ≥ Vu(a)∗ and the worker
accepts the offer. Since matches are heterogeneous in their productivity, not all matches lead to a filled
job. When a worker matches with a firm the productivity must be high enough for him to give up
his value of continued search and enter employment. The worker will choose employment whenever
w(λ, a) ≥ wR(a), so his reservation match value is λR(a) = wR(a)/a.
If the firmmatches with a criminal, the problem it faces in the first stage depends on the productivity
of the job. It is easy to show that aλD2(a) > wC(a) for all a∗, so if the match productivity is greater
than λD2(a) the wage in either outcome of the second stage will be high enough to deter the worker
from crime. Again the firm must offer at least the expected value of the second stage, given by:
βVe(aλ, a) + (1 − β)Ve(wC(a), a) = Ve(βaλ + (1 − β)wC(a), a) (16)
since the value of employment is linear in the wage if the worker does not commit crimes in either state
of the second stage. If β ≥ 0 then the expected value of the second stage is greater than or equal to
Ve(wC(a), a), implying that if the firm deters a worker from crime in the second stage it will also deter
him in the first stage. For criminals who match at productivity λ ≥ λD2(a), the firm must offer at least
the expected wage of the second stage. Therefore, the firm’s first stage problem is:
w(a, λ) = argmax
w
aλ − w
r + δ
s.t. w ≥ βaλ + (1 − β)wC(a). (17)
Again the firm offers the worker the expected wage of the second stage w(a, λ) = βaλ + (1 − β)wC(a),
and the worker accepts the job and does not commit crimes while employed.
If the total match productivity is below the crime reservation wage, aλ < wC(a) then in either
outcome of the second stage the wage is not high enough to deter the worker from committing crimes
while employed. In this case the expected value of the second stage for the worker is:
βVe(aλ, a) + (1 − β)Ve(wR(a), a) = Ve(βaλ + (1 − β)wR(a), a) (18)
since the value of employment is linear in the wage if the worker commits crimes in either state in
the second stage. Therefore the firm must offer at least the expected wage of the second stage for the
worker to accept the offer. Since the total productivity of the match is less than the crime reservation
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wage in this case, the firm will never deter the worker from crime. Therefore the problem the firm faces
for such match values is:
w(a, λ) = argmax
w
aλ − w
r + δ
s.t. w ≥ βaλ + (1 − β)wR(a). (19)
and the firm offers the worker the expected wage of the second stage, w(a, λ) = βaλ + (1 − β)wR(a)
and the worker accepts the job and commits crimes while employed.
If the total match productivity is above the crime reservation wage but below the productivity
needed for the firm to deter the worker from crime in the second stage, wC(a) < aλ < aλD2(a), the
expected value of the second stage for the worker is:
βVe(aλ, a) + (1 − β)Ve(wR(a), a)
= β
[
aλ − χL + δVu(a)
r + δ
]
+ (1 − β)
[
wR(a) − χL + δVu(a) + µe(g + piVp(a))
r + δ + µepi
]
(20)
since the worker will commit crimes if the firm makes the offer in the second stage, but forgo crime
opportunities if he gets to set the wage in the second stage. The constraint the firm faces in the second
stage is to offer a wage such that the value of employment is at least as large as the expected value of
the second stage:
Ve(w, a) ≥ β
[
aλ − χL + δVu(a)
r + δ
]
+ (1 − β)
[
wR(a) − χL + δVu(a) + µe(g + piVp(a))
r + δ + µepi
]
(21)
First, one can show that if (r + δ)/µepi ≤ (1 − β)/β then all match productivities for which wC(a) <
aλ < aλD2(a), the wage which makes the worker indifferent to accepting the first round offer and
moving to the second stage is not high enough to deter the worker from crime. Therefore Equation 21
simplifies to
w ≥ β(r + δ + µepi)[aλ − (χL + rVu(a))]
r + δ
+ wR(a) (22)
In this case the firm has a choice to make in the first stage: offer a wage at least as large as the wage
constraint in Equation 22 for which the worker will commit crimes on the job or raise the wage to the
crime reservation wage, wC(a), to deter the worker from crime. The firm’s first stage problem is:
w(a, λ) = argmax
w
{
argmax
w
aλ − w
r + δ
s.t. w≥wC (a)
, argmax
w
aλ − w
r + δ + µepi
s.t. wC (a)>w & Equation 22
}
. (23)
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As before, the firm faces the trade off between a higher flow value for a shorter duration or a lower
flow value for a longer duration. There exists a productivity, λD1(a), such that if λ < λD1(a) the firm
will offer the wage which makes Equation 22 bind and the worker will accept the job, at which he
continues to commit crimes. If λ ≥ λD1(a) the firm will offer the crime reservation wage and the
worker will accept the offer, since the value of employment at the crime reservation wage is above the
expected value of the second stage. While employed at wC(a), the worker will not commit crimes. The
productivity above which firms deter workers from crime in the first stage is
λD1(a) = (r + δ + µepi)[wC(a) + β(χL + rVu(a))] − (r + δ)wR(a)
a(µepi + β(r + δ + µepi)) . (24)
The full wage profile for criminals in this case is:
w(a, λ) =

βaλ + (1 − β)wR(a) if λR(a) ≤ λ < wC(a)/a
β(r+δ+µepi)[aλ−(χL+rVu (a))]
r+δ + wR(a) if wC(a)/a ≤ λ < λD1(a)
wC(a) if λD1(a) ≤ λ < λD2(a)
βaλ + (1 − β)wC(a) if λ ≥ λD2(a).
(25)
Figure 2 shows the wage profile for a worker of type Vu(a) < Vu(a)∗. The worker gets the expected
wage of the second stage for all matches with productivity λR(a) ≤ λ < wC(a)/a, the wage that makes
constraint Equation 22 bind for all match productivities wC(a)/a ≤ λ < λD1(a), the crime reservation
wage for matches with productivity λD1(a) ≤ λ < λD2(a) and the expected wage of the second stage for
matches with productivity λ ≥ λD2(a). Proposition 2.2 gives a summary of the worker’s employment
and crime decisions for all match values.
Proposition 2.2. If (r + δ)/µepi ≤ (1 − β)/β then,
a. If φu(a) = 0 then for all λ ≥ λR(a) the worker accepts the job and φe(a,w(a, λ)) = 0.
b. If φu(a) = 1 then for all λR(a) ≤ λ ≤ λD1(a) the worker accepts the job and φe(a,w(a, λ)) = 1.
c. If φu(a) = 1 then for all λ ≥ λD1(a) the worker accepts the job and φe(a,w(a, λ)) = 0.
Proof. See proof in Appendix section A.1. □
Figure 3 gives a graphical representation of Proposition 2.2; note the figure plots total match
productivity on the y-axis. The slopes of the deterrence match values, λD1(a) and λD2(a), depend on
parameter values and can be either negative or positive, however since the worker’s reservation wage is
always less than his crime reservation wage one can show that λD1(a) < λD2(a). The figure shows the
case where both λD1(a) and λD2(a) are decreasing in ability.
Notice that both wage profiles are fully characterized by the match productivity and the workers
values of unemploymentVu(a) through the reservation wage and crime reservation wage. For criminals,
13
Figure 2: Wage Profile for Workers with Vu(a) < Vu(a)∗
w
aλ
wC(a)
w(a, λ)
aλD2(a)aλR(a)
wR(a)
aλD1(a)
45◦
Vu(a) < Vu(a)∗, substituting in the wage equation gives the value of unemployment:
rVu(a) = ab−χL + µuφu(a)[Ku(a) − Vu(a)]
+µj
[ ∫ wC (a)/a
λR (a)
Ve(βaλ + (1 − β)wR(a), a) − Vu(a) dG(λ)
+
∫ λD1(a)
wC (a)/a
Ve
(
β(r + δ + µepi)[aλ − (χL + rVu(a))]
r + δ
+ wR(a), a
)
− Vu(a) dG(λ)
+
∫ λD2(a)
λD1(a)
Ve(wC(a), a) − Vu(a) dG(λ) (26)
+
∫
λD2(a)
Ve(βaλ + (1 − β)wC(a), a) dG(λ)
]
.
Equation 26 recursively defines Vu(a) for each a, given the equations for the reservation match values,
λR(a) = wR(a)/a, Equation 24 for λD1(a), and Equation 13 for λD2(a), as well as the equations for the
reservation wage, Equation 10, the crime reservation wage, Equation 11, and the value of employment,
Equation 6.
3 Steady State
To solve for the steady-state distribution of workers across states, first define for workers with ability
a the measure u(a), unemployed; ec(a), employed and committing crimes; enc(a), employed and not
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Figure 3: Reservation match values and decision rules
aλ
a
aλR(a)
aλD2(a)
aλD1(a)
a∗
Crime and Unemployed
Crime and Employed
No Crime and Unemployed
w = wc(a)
No Crime and Employed
committing crimes; and p(a), in prison. A worker with a < a∗ is a potential criminal and can flow
between all four states, and a worker with a ≥ a∗ will never commit a crime and can only flow between
u(a) and enc(a).
For a potential criminal the flow from unemployment to employment and crime is equal to the
probability that he receives a job offer times the probability that the productivity of the job is above his
reservation match value and below the productivity at which a firm will deter him from crime:
µj
[
G
(
λD1(a)) − G (λR(a)) ] ≡ µjD(a). (27)
The flow from unemployment to employment and not committing crimes is equal to the probability
that the worker receives a job offer, times the probability that the productivity of the job is above the
value at which a firm will deter him from crime:
µj
[
1 − G (λD1(a)) ] ≡ µjA(b). (28)
For a non-criminal, the flow from unemployment to employment is equal to the probability that he
receives a job offer, times the probability that the productivity of the job is above his reservation match
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Figure 4: Labor Market Flows
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(a) Flows for a < a∗
enc(a)
u(a)
δ µ jB(a)
(b) Flows for a > a∗
value:
µj
[
1 − G (λR(a)) ] ≡ µjB(a). (29)
Figure 4 shows the labor market flows for both types of workers.
A steady state is a set of measures {u(a), ec(a), enc(a), p(a)} for all a such that the flows between
states are equal. The solution to the steady-state measures can be found in appendix section A.2. The
aggregate measure of unemployed criminals and aggregate measure of unemployed non-criminals are:
uc =
∫ a∗
u(a) dF(a) (30)
unc =
∫
a∗
u(a) dF(a). (31)
The aggregate measure of workers employed and committing crimes and the aggregate measure of
workers employed and not committing crimes are:
ec =
∫ a∗
ec(a) dF(a) (32)
enc =
∫
enc(a) dF(a). (33)
The aggregate measure of workers in prison is:
p =
∫ a∗
p(a) dF(a). (34)
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The steady-state unemployment rate is:
U =
∫
u(a)
1 − p(a) dF(a) (35)
and the crime rate is:
C =
∫ a∗ µuu(a) + µeec(a)
1 − p(a) dF(a). (36)
Here I have use the non-institutionalized population as the denominator for the aggregate unemployment
rate and the aggregate crime rate.
4 A Binding MinimumWage
The minimum wage will change the interactions between the firm and the worker by acting as a
constraint that each must consider when making a wage offer. I will assume the minimum wage, m, is
set exogenously by the government and that all matches are subject to this constraint. Since wages are
the only transfer from the firm to the worker, the firm cannot alter any other forms of compensation
to undo the effect of the minimum wage. A minimum wage is binding if it alters the outcome of the
bargaining problem for at least one type of worker and at least one job productivity. The question of
interest is then: how does the minimum wage change wages and in turn a worker’s decision to commit
crimes?
4.1 Wages
The minimum wage enters the bargaining problem as a constraint; firms and workers can never offer a
wage below m in the first stage or the second stage of the bargaining process. Under the constrained
game, there exists a new value of unemployment for the worker that will depend on the minimum wage,
I denote this value as Vu(a,m). First, the lowest wage paid to a worker of ability a is aλR(a,m), thus
any minimum wage for which there exists an a such that m > aλR(a,m) = wR(a) is binding. An
immediate implication of a binding minimum wage is that matches with total productivity less than m
are no longer feasible.
Starting with the simplest case, if the minimum wage is binding for a non-criminal the firm must
offer at least m in the second stage. The expected wage of the second stage for the worker becomes
βaλ + (1 − β)m. In the first stage the firm offers a wage that maximizes profits subject to the worker
accepting the offer. As before, it offers the expected wage of the second stage and since m > aλR(a,m),
wages increase for all productivities.
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Figure 5: Constrained Second Stage
Worker: w = aλ
β
Firm:
1 − β
crimeaλ < wC
no crimeaλ ≥ wC
w = wC → no crimeλ ≥ λD2(m)
w = max{m,wR} → crime
λ < λD2(m)
(a) For a worker of ability a with m < wC(a)
Worker: w = aλ
β
Firm: w = max{m,wC} → no crime
1 − β
crimeaλ < wC
no crimeaλ ≥ wC
(b) For a worker of ability a with m ≥ wC(a)
For a potential criminal, the solution to the constrained bargaining problem depends on whether
or not the minimum wage is larger than the crime reservation wage. If m < wC(a) then only jobs
with productivities at which the firm does not deter the worker in the second stage are constrained.
Figure 5a shows the constrained second stage. Since the minimum wage is less than the worker’s crime
reservation wage the firm must choose whether or not to deter the worker from crime in the second
stage. The firm faces the following problem in the second stage:
w(a, λ) = argmax
{m,wC }
{
aλ − m
r + δ + µepi
,
aλ − wC(a)
r + δ
}
. (37)
As with the unconstrained problem, for low productivity jobs, the firm will choose to pay the minimum
wage and have a shorter job duration. The match value that makes the firm indifferent to deterring or
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not deterring the worker in the second stage is now,
λD2(a,m) = (r + δ + µepi)wC(a) − (r + δ)m
aµepi
(38)
above which the firm will choose to offer the crime reservation wage and receive a lower flow value for
a longer duration. In the case that the total match productivity is less than the crime reservation wage,
wC(a), a binding minimum wage implies that the expected value of the second stage is,
βVe(aλ, a) + (1 − β)Ve(m, a) = Ve(βaλ + (1 − β)m, a) (39)
since the worker will commit crimes in both possible outcomes of the second stage, the value of
employment is linear in the wage. If the total match productivity of the job is less than the crime
reservation wage, the firm will not deter the worker from crime in the first stage, so it offers the worker
the expected wage of the second stage, w(λ, a) = βaλ + (1 − β)m.
If the total match productivity is greater than the crime reservation wage but not high enough for
the firm to deter in the second stage, wC(a) < aλ < aλD2(a,m), then the worker’s expected value of
the second stage is:
Ve(w, a) ≥ β
[
aλ − χL + δVu(a)
r + δ
]
+ (1 − β)
[
m − χL + δVu(a) + µe(g + piVp(a))
r + δ + µepi
]
(40)
which simplifies to the following constraint on the wage:
w ≥ β(r + δ + µepi)[aλ − (χL + rVu(a))](r + δ) + wR(a) + (1 − β)(m − wR(a)). (41)
Again the firm can choose to deter the worker from crime in the first stage by offering at least the crime
reservation wage or it can offer the worker the expected value of the second stage, in which case it
receives a higher flow value for a shorter duration. The firm’s problem in the first stage is:
w(a, λ) = argmax
w
{
argmax
w
aλ − w
r + δ
s.t. w≥wC (a)
, argmax
w
aλ − w
r + δ + µepi
s.t. wC (a)>w & Equation 41
}
. (42)
The solution is similar to the unconstrained problem: for low productivities the firm gives the worker
the expected value of the second stage by paying the wage that makes Equation 41 bind, and there exists
some productivity, λD1(a,m), above which the firm deters the worker from crime by offering the crime
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reservation wage.
λD1(a,m) = (r + δ + µepi)[wC(a) + β(χL + rVu(a))] − (r + δ)[wR(a) + (1 − β)(m − wR(a))]
a(µepi + β(r + δ + µepi)) (43)
Figure 6 shows the wage profile with the minimum wage imposed. The new wage offered by the firm is
w˜(a, λ;m) =

βaλ + (1 − β)m if m ≤ λ < wC(a)
β(r+δ+µepi)[aλ−(χL+rVu (a))]
(r+δ) + wR(a) + (1 − β)(m − wR(a)) if wC(a) ≤ λ < λD1(a,m)
wC(a) if λD1(a,m) ≤ λ < λD2(a,m)
βaλ + (1 − β)wC(a) if λ ≥ λD2(a,m).
(44)
Figure 6 shows that a binding minimum wage compresses the wage distribution for a worker up to
λD2(a). Proposition 4.1 summarizes the effects on the wage distribution. Part a.i. implies that a firm
will deter the worker from crime for a larger range of productivities. With the minimum wage, the flow
value of a filled job decreases, since the expected value of the second stage increases. A reduction in
the flow value of the job reduces the benefit to the firm from offering a wage lower than the worker’s
crime reservation wage, and therefore the firm will choose to deter the worker from crime for more job
productivities.
Proposition 4.1.
a. If (r + δ)/µepi ≤ (1 − β)/β and m < wC(a) then
i. ∂λ
D1(a,m)
∂m < 0
i. ∂λ
D2(a,m)
∂m < 0
iii. w˜(a, λ;m) ≥ w(a, λ) for all m ≤ λ < λD2(a,m)
b. If m ≥ wC(a) then w˜(a, λ;m) > w(a, λ) for all matches values that lead to a filled job.
If the minimum wage is above the crime reservation wage the firm has no decision to make in the
second stage since all wages it can offer will deter the worker from crime while employed. Figure 5b
shows the constrained second stage for which the expected wage is now βaλ + (1 − β)m for all feasible
matches. Since the worker will forgo crime opportunities in either state, the expected value for the
worker of the second stage is linear and so the firm must offer at least the expected wage of the second
stage. If there is some positive probability that the worker gets to set the wage in the second stage, then
the expected wage of the second stage is strictly greater than the crime reservation wage. Therefore,
the firm does not need to decide whether or not to deter the worker from crime in the first stage and
faces the following problem in the first stage:
w(a, λ) = argmax
w
λ − w
r + δ
s.t. w ≥ βλ + (1 − β)m. (45)
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Figure 6: Wage Profile for Constrained Workers with Vu(a) < Vu(a)∗
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The firm maximizes profits by offering the expected wage of the second stage, which the worker will
accept and forgo crimes while employed. The wage is simply w˜(a, λ;m) = βaλ + (1 − β)m for all
aλ ≥ m. Part b. of Proposition 4.1 summarizes the effect of a minimum wage in this case and Figure
7 shows the effect on the worker’s wage profile, which increases for all feasible matches.
Figure 7: Constrained Wage Profile for workers with Vu(a) < Vu(a)∗ when m ≥ wC(a)
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4.2 Workers
Since meeting rates are exogenous the minimum wage will have no effect on the rate at which a worker
meets with a firm. However, the minimum wage will change the range of productivities at which a
worker will choose to commit crimes and therefore the rate at which he flows into and out of a criminal
state. A potential criminal will commit crimes for all matches with productivity less than λD1(a,m);
if the productivity is less than max{m/a, λR(a,m)} he will commit crimes at rate µu because he is
unemployed and if the productivity is greater than max{m/a, λR(a,m)} but less than λD1(a,m) he will
commit crimes at rate µe because the wage offered by such a job is not high enough to deter him from
crime.
A binding minimum wage will have three effects on a worker’s propensity to commit crimes: a
wage effect, an unemployment effect, and an indirect effect. The wage effect occurs when workers are
deterred from committing crimes due to receiving a higher wage. The unemployment effect occurs
when either: (1) a worker is displaced from jobs at which he would not have committed crimes or
(2) the rate at which he receives crime opportunities differs across states and he is displaced from any
job. The indirect effect is driven by changes in the unemployment value, Vu(a,m). A change in the
minimum wage will affect a worker’s value of unemployment and therefore indirectly affect the flows
between criminal and non-criminal states.
4.2.1 Wage Effect
Since all workers affected by the minimum wage experience an increase in wages for a range of
productivities, the wage effect exists for all workers with a reservation wage less than the minimum
wage. In Figure 8a this is all workers with ability less than a1. For a worker with ability less than a2
in Figure 8a, the minimum wage is higher than his crime reservation wage, and he will never commit
crimes while employed. Therefore, he flows out of a criminal state if he receive a job offer with
productivity greater than or equal to m/a.
For a worker with ability greater than a2 but less than a1 in Figure 8a, the crime reservation
wage is above the minimum wage and he will continue to commit crimes while employed in some
jobs. However, the range of productivities for which he commits crimes has decreased (part a.i. of
Proposition 4.1.) as shown by the fact that λD1(a) is greater than λD1(a,m) in Figure 8a. All together,
the blue shaded region of Figure 8a shows the matches that no longer lead to crime while employed due
to an increase in wages. In Figure 8b the minimum wage is above all workers’ crime reservation wage
and therefore all workers forgo crime while employed. Again, the wage effect corresponds to the blue
shaded region; these are matches at which a worker would have committed crimes before the minimum
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wage.
4.2.2 Unemployment Effect
There are two channels through which a worker will change the amount of crimes he commits due
to unemployment. First, if the rate at which he receives crime opportunities differs across states.
Specifically, if he receives more crime opportunities while unemployed, µe < µu, then when he is
displaced from a job, he will commit more crimes. In Figure 8a, this corresponds to the red shaded
region; these are productivities at which workers would have accepted a job and committed less crime
in the absence of the minimum wage.
Second, if a worker is displaced from a job at which he would not have committed a crime, then
the minimum wage will increase the amount of crimes he commits. This occurs when the minimum
wage is above the productivity at which the firm would have chosen to deterred the worker from crime.
This corresponds to matches with a total productivity greater than aλD1(a) and less than m in Figure
8a. Only workers with ability greater than a3 and less than a∗ are displaced from jobs at which they
would not have committed crimes. The red shaded region of Figures 8a and 8b shows the matches that
lead to an increase in crime through both channels.
4.2.3 Indirect Effect
The indirect effect of the minimumwage on a worker’s crime decisions is driven by changes in his value
of unemployment. Take, for example, a worker with ability greater than a2 and less than a1. From
Figure 8a it is clear that his value of unemployment has changed for two reasons: (1) some matches are
no longer feasible and (2) some matches experience a wage increase. The fact that some matches no
longer lead to filled jobs decreases his value of unemployment. On the other hand, the wage increase
for some matches increases his value of unemployment. Therefore, the overall effect of a minimum
wage on the worker’s value of unemployment is ambiguous, depends on the size of the minimum wage,
and varies across workers.
4.3 Equilibrium Crime Rate
The equilibrium crime rate given in Equation 36 depends on the steady state measures, u(a), ec(a), and
p(a), and the rates at which workers receive crime opportunities while employed, µe, and unemployed,
µu. When the minimum wage changes, the aggregate crime rate is affected by changes in workers’
decisions to commit crimes and accept jobs. From Figure 8a it is clear that workers are affected
differentially by the minimum wage; some workers are deterred from crime by more job productivities
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Figure 8: Minimum Wage Effects on Matches
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and are displaced from more jobs. Therefore, analytical results for a change in the crime rate depend
on the distribution of ability, the distribution of job productivities and the size of the minimum wage.
5 Calibration
The unit of time is one month and the rate of time preference is r = 0.0101. The model is calibrated
to match the crime and labor market in 1998. The model is normalized by setting the flow utility of
prison, z, equal to zero.11 The probability a worker gets to set the wage in the second stage, β, acts as
the worker’s bargaining power, which is set to β = 0.4 as estimated by Flinn (2006).
The crimes considered are Type 1 property crimes, defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) as larceny, burglary and motor vehicle theft. The probability of being caught is derived from
the clearance rate and the incarceration rate of these crimes as reported by the FBI’s Uniform Crime
Reports (UCR). The UCR defines the clearance rate as the ratio of arrests to crimes reported and the
incarceration rate as the ratio of convictions to arrests. In 1998 the clearance rate for property crimes
was 17.5% and the incarceration rate for property crimes was 65%, implying that the probability a
worker goes to prison is pi = 0.175 ∗ 0.65 = 0.114. The prison release rate is calibrated to target the
average time in prison for property crimes as reported by the National Corrections Reporting Program.
In 1998, the average time in prison for property crimes was 20 months implying γ = 1/20 = 0.05. The
UCR reports that the average loss per property crime in 1998 was $1, 407 implying that the gain from
crime is g = $1, 407. The expected loss, χL, is set such that the crime market is in equilibrium, that is,
the expected loss is the gain from crime times the crime rate, which is calculated below.
The remaining set of parameters (b, µe, µu, µj, µλ, σλ, µa, σa, δ), where µλ and σλ are the mean
and standard deviation of the job productivity distribution and µa and σa are the mean and standard
deviation of the ability distribution, are calibrated to match a set of empirical moments derived from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97). The data are collected from 8,984 respondents
who were ages 12-17 when first interviewed in 1997. Respondents were asked questions about their
labor market status including employment status, wages, and hours worked. The survey also asks
individuals to report the crimes they committed during the year, specifically useful for the question
posed here are individuals’ responses to the number of times they stole more than $50 worth and the
number of times they committed other property crimes such as fencing, receiving, possessing or selling
stolen property. In the first round of the survey, respondents were administered the computer-adaptive
11Since individuals can not choose how long to stay in prison, there does not exist an empirical moment that could pin down
the flow utility of prison.
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form of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (CAT-ASVAB).12
Nine empirical moments are constructed using the NLSY97 data for 1998, to target the remaining
parameters. The moments constructed are: the monthly crime rate, the ratio of the crime rate among
the unemployed to employed, the monthly unemployment rate, the monthly job finding probability,
the monthly separation rate, the 10th percentile to median and median to 90th percentile ratios of the
CAT-ASVAB scores, the minimum wage to median wage ratio, and the median to 75th percentile wage
ratio. Details of how these moments are constructed can be found in the Appendix, section A.4. Table 1
gives a summary of the empirical moments.
Table 1: Summary of Empirical Moments
Moment Value
Unemployment rate 0.124
Crime rate 0.042
Crime rate of Unemp. / Crime rate of Emp. 1.159
Job finding rate 0.160
Seperation rate 0.011
10th Percentile / 50th Percentile exp(CAT-ASVAB) 0.312
50th Percentile / 90th Percentile exp(CAT-ASVAB) 0.454
Minimum Wage / 50th Percentile Wage 0.880
50th Percentile / 75th Percentile Wage 0.900
Jobs separate at an exogenous rate in the model, so the separation rate δ is set to 0.011 to match
the monthly separation rate in the NLSY97. The two moments derived from the CAT-ASVAB scores
are used to calibrate a distribution of abilities. The CAT-ASVAB scores have a normal distribution in
the data; however, since ability multiplicatively enters into the total productivity of a job, a negative
ability level would imply never finding a productive job. Therefore, the CAT-ASVAB scores are
exponentiated, giving ability a log-normal distribution. Further, since the lower bound of a log-normal
distribution is zero, one is added to the exponentiated test scores, again insuring that all individuals
have a non-zero probability of finding a productive match. These assumptions lead to a distribution
of abilities, a − 1 ∼ ln N(µa, σa), where µa and σa are chosen to match the ratio of the 10th/50th
percentile and the 50th/90th percentile of the exponentiated CAT-ASVAB scores. Matching the ratios
of test scores assumes test scores ordinally identify ability.
The remaining six parameters, (b, µe, µu,µj ,µλ, σλ), are calibrated to match the remaining six
moments jointly using simulated method of moments. Although all six parameters influence all six
moments, intuitively the job productivity parameters, µλ and σλ, are chosen to target the ratios of the
12The CAT-ASVAB measures an individual’s knowledge in the following areas: Arithmetic Reasoning, Electronics Informa-
tion, Numerical Operations, Assembling Objects, General Science, Paragraph Comprehension, Auto Information, Mathematics
Knowledge, Shop Information, Coding Speed, Mechanical Comprehension, Word Knowledge.
26
wage distribution. The distribution for job productivities is log normal, λ ∼ ln N(µλ, σλ). The crime
arrival rates µu and µe are chosen to target the aggregate crime rate and relative crime rate of the
unemployed to employed. The job contact rate, µj , is chosen to target the job finding rate and the flow
value of unemployment b is chosen to target the unemployment rate.
The average weekly hours worked in the NLSY97 for 1998 was 21.7 and the minimum wage in
1998 wage $5.15 implying a monthly minimum wage of m = 5.15 × 21.7 × 4 = 446.06. The monthly
crime rate in 1998 measured from the NLSY97 was 0.042 and the gain from crime was $1, 407 so the
expected loss from crime is χL = $58.47. Table 2 and Table 3 summarize all parameters and Table 4
gives the empirical and model generated moments.
Table 2: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Description
r 0.0101 real interest rate
β 0.4 bargaining power of workers
χL $58.47 expected loss from crime
z 0 prison utility
γ 0.05 prison release rate
pi 0.114 probability of getting caught
m $446.06 minimum wage
g $1, 407 gain from crime
Table 3: Simulated Method of Moments Estimates
Parameter Estimate p5 p95 Description
δ 0.011 0.001 0.013 separation rate
b −26.70 −31.6930 −25.0907 flow utility of unemployment
µe 0.2391 0.1835 0.3074 arrival rate of crime opp. while emp.
µu 0.0468 0.0213 0.0581 arrival rate of crime opp. while unemp.
µj 4.1692 3.5595 5.0588 arrival rate of jobs opportunities
µλ 0.8623 0.6947 0.9578 mean of productivity distribution
σλ 0.5291 0.4939 0.5809 s.d. of productivity distribution
µa 4.6256 4.5545 4.7296 mean ability
σa 0.6293 0.5945 0.6738 s.d. of ability
Note: The columns labeled p5 and p95 give the 5th and 95th percentile of estimates from 500 bootstrapped
samples.
The estimated crime arrival rates are 0.24 while employed and 0.05 while unemployed, implying a
monthly probability of finding a crime opportunity of 0.21while employed and 0.05while unemployed.
The job offer rate is 4.2, implying a monthly probability of receiving a job offer of 0.98. The calibrated
27
Table 4: Moments Matched
Moment Empirical Model
Unemployment rate 0.124 0.124
Crime rate 0.042 0.041
Crime rate of Unemp. / Crime rate of Emp. 1.159 1.159
Job finding rate 0.160 0.159
10th Percentile / 50th Percentile exp(CAT-ASVAB) 0.312 0.312
50th Percentile / 90th Percentile exp(CAT-ASVAB) 0.454 0.454
Minimum Wage / 50th Percentile Wage 0.880 0.883
50th Percentile / 75th Percentile Wage 0.900 0.899
mean and variance of the job productivity distribution and the ability distribution imply a mean total
job productivity, aλ, of $341.31 and a standard deviation of $346.14.
5.1 Model Generated Elasticities
Since the effect of the minimum wage on the crime rate is driven through changes in the labor market,
I test the model in two dimensions: the response of workers’ crime decisions with respect to changes
in the labor market and changes in the labor market with respect to changes in the minimum wage.
Specifically, two data sets are generated through simulation of the model, similar to those used by
empirical researchers, and used to estimate the elasticity of crime with respect to unemployment and
wages and the elasticity of employment and earnings with respect to the minimum wage. I compare
the estimated elasticities that the calibrated model delivers to those found in the empirical literature to
validate the relationship between the labor market and criminal propensity and the minimum wage and
the labor market. Both data sets are generated based on variation in the real minimum wage observed
across states from 1990 to 2011. Table 5 summaries the variation in the minimum wage across the
sample; the real binding minimum wage is the maximum of the state and federal minimum wage in
1998 dollars.
Table 5: Minimum Wage Summary Statistics
Mean St. dev. Min Max
Federal Min. Wage 5.24 0.99 3.80 7.25
State Min. Wage 5.30 1.31 1.6 8.67
Binding Min. Wage 5.46 1.15 3.80 8.67
Real Binding Min. Wage 5.09 0.55 4.34 6.83
The first data generated is a panel of 1,000 individuals for every realization of the real binding
minimum wage; this gives a total sample size of 204,000. For each individual the probability of
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unemployment and employment, probability of committing a crime, and expected wage are simulated
using the calibrated parameters. Full details of the simulations can be found in the Appendix, section
A.5. Using the simulated unemployment probability and simulated expected wage, expected monthly
earnings are calculated as the employment probability times the expected wage. Panel A of Table 6
gives the summary statistics for the generated sample.
The generated sample is used to estimate the elasticity of workers’ crime decisions with respect
to unemployment and wages and the model generated elasticities are compared to those found in the
empirical literature. The model generated elasticities are estimated by the following regressions:
(1) ln crimei,m = α0 + α1Um + εi,m
(2) ln crimei,m = β0 + β1 ln Earningsi,m + εi,m
where ln crimei,m is the natural log of the simulated probability of committing a crime for worker i for
minimum wage m, Um is the unemployment probability for minimum wage m, ln Earningsi,m is the
natural log of earnings for worker i at minimum wage m and εi,m is statistical noise generated in the
simulation through the random draw of a crime opportunity and job productivity. Panel B of Table 6
gives the regression results.
Table 6: Simulated Individual Analysis
Panel A: Simulated Data Summary Statistics
Mean St. dev. Min Max
Crime 0.036 0.034 0 0.154
Wage 609.51 213.95 394.71 2424.40
Earnings 532.31 267.01 0 2385.61
Unemployment 0.143 0.240 0 1
Panel B: Regression Results
ln Crime ln Crime
(1) (2)
Unemployment 2.15
ln (Earnings) −0.29
N 204,000 204,000
Note: Observations for which crime or earnings equal 0 were replace with 0.0001 before
taking logs.
Several empirical studies have estimated the elasticity of crime with respect to unemployment and
wages and find a semi-elasticity of crime with respect to unemployment, αˆ1, of 1.2 to 2, and an elasticity
of crime with respect to earnings, βˆ1, of -0.5 to -2 (Gould et al., 2002; Naci and Bulent, 2017; Schnepel,
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2014). The model generated elasticity of crime with respect to earnings, −0.29, is on the low side of the
empirically estimated range. The model generates an elasticity of crime with respect to unemployment,
2.15, that is slightly higher than the empirically estimated elasticities.
To estimate the response of the labor market to changes in the minimum wage within the model, a
cross section of aggregate employment probabilities, and expected wages for every unique realization
of the real binding minimum wage within the sample is generated. The generated data have a sample
size of 1,122. Full details of the simulations can be found in the Appendix, section A.5. Aggregate
monthly earnings are constructed by multiplying the employment rate by wages. Using the aggregate
sample, the model’s generated elasticities are estimated by the following regressions:
(1) ln Empm = ξ0 + ξ1 lnMinWagem + εm
(2) ln Earningsm = ψ0 + ψ1 lnMinWagem + εm
where ln Empm is the natural log of the average employment probability for minimum wage m,
ln Earningsm is the natural log of average earnings for minimum wage m, and εm is statistical noise
generated from the random draws from the productivity distribution. Panel A of Table 7 gives summary
statistics for the aggregate data and Panel B of Table 7 gives the regression results.
Table 7: Simulated Aggregates Analysis
Panel A: Simulated Data Summary Statistics
Mean St. dev. Min Max
Unemployment 0.127 0.026 0.072 0.221
Employment 0.873 0.026 0.779 0.927
Wage 598.57 36.78 534.19 722.86
Earnings 524.35 19.71 469.12 594.73
Panel B: Regression Results
Dependent Variable
ln Emp lnWage
lnMinWage −0.264 0.299
N 1,122 1,122
The literature on the employment effects of the minimum wage is lengthy and mixed, see Neumark
and Wascher (2007) for a review. Dube et al. (2010) study employment effects on restaurant workers
and find no significant effect. The employment effects from the minimum wage on teen employment is
mixed as well; Allegretto et al. (2010) find no significant employment effects and Neumark et al. (2014)
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find significant employment effects on teens with estimated elasticities around −0.313. The estimated
elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum wage within the calibrated model is −0.264,
lower than the upper bound of the empirical literature. However, recent work from Jardim et al. (2017)
suggests that the elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum wage may be much higher than
previously estimated. The empirically estimated elasticity of wages with respect to the minimum wage
is between 0.15 and 0.22 (Dube et al., 2010; Allegretto et al., 2010). The model delivers an estimated
elasticity of 0.3, slightly higher than the empirical literature.
Overall, the calibrated model generates elasticities similar to those estimated in the empirical
literature; changes in labor market conditions within the calibrated model affect an individual’s crime
decisions similarly to what can be observed in data. Furthermore, the effect of minimum wages on
aggregate labor market conditions within the calibrated model are comparable to those estimated in
the empirical literature. Since the calibrated model does not match these elasticities I argue that these
results establish a degree of external validity for the calibrated model.
6 Increasing the MinimumWage
Using the calibrated parameters, I solve the model for minimum wages between $5 and $15. For this
exercise, the probability of being victimized, χ, is endogenized such that it is equal to the crime rate
in steady state. Figure 9 shows the change in the aggregate crime rate, Equation 36, over the range
of minimum wages. The figure shows that the aggregate crime rate decreases with minimum wages
between $5 and $7.50, implying that the wage effect outweighs the unemployment effect over this range.
With minimumwages above $7.50, the crime rate begins to increase as the unemployment effect begins
to dominate. Figure 9 also plots the crime rate with respect to the minimum to median wage ratio.
Since increases in the minimum wage affect the entire wage distribution, observing how the crime rate
changes with respect to the minimum to median wage ratio is more informative for optimal policy. The
model reveals that the crime rate is minimized when the minimum wage is 0.91 of the median wage of
16 to 19 year olds.
The fact that the aggregate crime rate responds more to changes in wages than to changes in
unemployment for relatively small increases in the minimumwage stems from the fact that employment
decreases only marginally. This finding is similar to Imrohoroglu et al. (2004) who find that rising
average incomes from 1980 to 1996 alone could account for 20% of the decrease in crime observed over
the period, whereas the small increases in youth unemployment over the same period had no effect on
the aggregate crime rate. The non-monotonicity of the crime rate is driven by a similar mechanism as
13Similarly, Gorry (2013) finds a positive effect of the minimum wage on teen unemployment.
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Figure 9: Crime Rate
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in Engelhardt et al. (2008), who show that the crime rate is non-monotonic in the worker’s bargaining
power. For low minimum wages, as for low bargaining powers, the worker has a greater incentive to
commit crimes because his labor market outcomes are low in terms of wages. As the minimum wage
increases, or bargaining power increases, the worker’s incentive to commit crimes decreases because
his labor market outcomes in terms of wages increase. However, once the minimum wage increases
above a certain point, the probability he finds a feasible match is too low and his labor market outcomes
decease because of high unemployment, which increases his incentive to commit crime. Similarly in
Engelhardt et al. (2008) a high bargaining power for the worker decreases the firm’s incentive to open
vacancies, decreasing the worker’s labor market outcomes through high unemployment, increasing his
incentive to commit crimes. As Flinn (2006) points out, one can think of the minimumwage as a policy
tool that increases the worker’s bargaining power.
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6.1 Empirical Evidence
Figure 9 shows that the model predicts the minimum wage to have a U-shaped effect on the crime rate.
In this section I use county level crime data from 1995 to 2014 to test this prediction. The county
level crime data come from the FBI’s UCR; the data include the number of Type 1 property crimes
(burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft) and the number of robberies, classified as a Type 1 violent
crime, reported to the police. The variable of interest is the minimum to median wage ratio, which is
constructed at the state level for 16 to 19 year olds using the Current Population Survey’s Outgoing
Rotation Groups. Since crimes reported to the police can not be broken down by age, I test the U-shape
prediction on the aggregate crime rate in the county. Figure 10 shows the variation of the minimum
to median wage ratio over the full sample. The average minimum to median wage ratio is 0.86 with a
standard deviation of 0.08. A full description of the data can be found in the Appendix, section A.4.
Figure 10: Minimum to Median Wage Ratio Histogram
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I test the prediction of the model using a non-parametric regression of county level crime rates
on state level variation of the minimum to median wage ratio. I use a non-parametric approach to
estimate the relationship between the minimum wage and the aggregate crime rate since it is the most
flexible; specifying a quadratic relationship can deliver only three outcomes: no relationship, a linear
or quadratic relationship. The minimum to median wage ratio is bound into quintiles; Table 8 gives the
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Table 8: Binding Minimum Wage to Median Wage by Quintile
Quintile Min-to-Median Ratio
Mean Median
1 0.738 0.736
2 0.816 0.817
3 0.871 0.863
4 0.915 0.906
5 0.962 0.964
mean and median value in each quintile. The model that is estimated is as follows:
crimect = β1+
5∑
j=2
β1j1{MMst ∈ (q( j − 1), q( j)]} + β6Xct + β7crimect−1 + γc + εct (46)
where q( j) is the j th quintile of the minimum to median wage ratio (MM) in state s at time t, and 1
is the indicator function. γc are county fixed effects and Xct are demographic controls, the poverty
rate, and the log of average household income in county c in year t. The specification includes a lag
dependent variable to capture county level trends in the crime rate. The specification is estimated
for five dependent variables: burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, total Type 1 property crimes (the
sum of burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft) and robbery. Since ordinary least squares (OLS)
delivers inconsistent estimates with fixed effects and lagged dependent variables,14 I use the second
lag, crimect−2, to instrument for the first lag, as suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2008).
Table 9 gives the estimated coefficients on the quintiles of the minimum to median wage ratio for
each dependent variable under OLS. Column (1) of Table 9 shows that moving from the first quintile to
the third quintile of the minimum to median wage ratio has a negative and significant effect on property
crimes within the county, decreasing property crimes by 82 crimes per 100,000 people. Moving from
the first to the fourth quintile decreases property crimes by 120 crimes per 100,000 people. Moving
from the first to the fifth quintile has a negative and significant effect on crime, however, the effect is less
than when moving to the fourth quintile. A move from the first quintile to the fifth quintile decreases
crime by 98 crimes per 100,000 people. Panel (a) of Figure 11 plots the estimated coefficients at the
mean minimum to median wage ratio of each quintile, along with the 95% confidence intervals. The
figure reveals a clear U-shape in the relationship between the minimum to median wage ratio and the
property crime rate. Comparing panel (a) of Figure 11 to Figure 9 shows that the model and empirical
exercise predict that the crime minimizing minimum to median wage ratio for 16 to 19 year olds is
14See Nickell (1981) for reference.
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Table 9: Regression Results: OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Property Burglary Larceny Motor Vehicle RobberyCrimes Theft
Quintile of
Min-to-Median Ratio
2nd. -8.785 0.999 5.733 -5.829∗∗∗ -0.569
(7.762) (2.386) (5.199) (0.950) (0.318)
3rd. -81.74∗∗∗ -6.178∗ -15.13∗ -9.961∗∗∗ -1.491∗∗∗
(8.996) (2.739) (6.093) (1.131) (0.399)
4th. -120.4∗∗∗ 8.876∗∗ -8.960 -15.53∗∗∗ -1.883∗∗∗
(8.988) (2.878) (5.835) (1.134) (0.414)
5th. -97.76∗∗∗ 19.94∗∗∗ 2.854 -13.90∗∗∗ -0.515
(9.572) (3.073) (6.450) (1.123) (0.399)
Mean Dep. Variable 2370.83 564.94 1566.92 152.30 40.61
N 51,418 51,418 51,418 51,418 51,418
Standard errors clustered at the county level. All specifications include demographic controls, county
fixed effects, household income, poverty levels and a lag dependent variable. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001
0.91. Columns (2) − (5) of Table 9 and panels (b) − (e) reveal similar U-shaped relationships for the
disaggregated categories of Type 1 property crimes and robbery.
Table 10 gives the estimated coefficients on the quintiles of the minimum to median wage ratio for
each dependent variable for the instrumental variable (IV) regression. The magnitudes of the effect of
a move from the first quintile to subsequent quintiles differ from the IV estimates to the OLS estimates
but the U-shaped relationship continues to hold. A move from the first quintile to all higher quintiles is
negative for property crimes. However, a move from the first quintile to the fifth quintile is smaller in
absolute magnitude than a move from the first to the fourth quintile, suggesting a U-shaped relationship
between the minimum to median wage ratio and the property crime rate. Similar relationships between
the minimum to median wage ratio and the burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and robbery rates can
be seen in columns (2) − (5) of Table 10.
To test the strength of the U-shape relationships revealed in the non-parametric regression, I test
for equality among the estimated coefficients on the quintiles of the minimum to median wage ratio.
Table 11 gives the F statistic and corresponding p-values for each test for both the OLS and IV results.
Column (4) tests if all coefficients are simultaneously equal; the test shows a constant effect of the
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Table 10: Regression Results: IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Property Burglary Larceny Motor Vehicle RobberyCrimes Theft
Quintile of
Min-to-Median Ratio
2nd. -6.064 -0.288 6.580 -4.511∗∗∗ -0.681∗
(7.727) (2.375) (5.173) (0.904) (0.332)
3rd. -87.48∗∗∗ -10.28∗∗∗ -23.52∗∗∗ -9.196∗∗∗ -1.929∗∗∗
(8.492) (2.540) (5.641) (1.042) (0.400)
4th. -115.4∗∗∗ 3.903 -12.12∗ -12.33∗∗∗ -2.432∗∗∗
(8.235) (2.646) (5.209) (0.982) (0.378)
5th. -104.4∗∗∗ 13.65∗∗∗ -4.954 -11.96∗∗∗ -1.553∗∗∗
(8.959) (2.941) (5.917) (1.017) (0.351)
First Stage F-Stat 2,334.8 1,068.3 2,540.2 2,494.4 1,189.0
N 50,619 50,619 50,619 50,619 50,619
Standard errors clustered at the county level. All specifications include demographic controls, county
fixed effects, household income, poverty levels. The lagged dependent variable is instrumented with
the second lag. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
minimum to median wage ratio on all crimes can be ruled out for estimates from both the OLS and
IV regressions. Since the estimated coefficient on the fifth quintile is less than the fourth quintile for
property crimes, column (3) tests for the U-shape relationship. Column (3) rules out that the decrease
in property crimes from moving from the first quintile to the fourth quintile is equal to a move from the
first quintile to the fifth quintile of the minimum to median wage ratio with a p-value of 0.003 for the
estimates from OLS. For the estimates from the IV regressions, the test shows that the decrease in the
property crime rate from moving from the first quintile to the fourth quintile is equal to a move from
the first quintile to the fifth quintile can be ruled out at 13% significance level with a p-value of 0.12.
Similarly, linearity can be ruled out for the other crime categories from the OLS regressions, and for
burglary and robbery from the IV regressions.
The Appendix, section A.6 shows the U-shaped relationship is robust to different specifications.
Table 12 shows that the U-shaped pattern is robust to excluding the lagged dependent variable for all
crime categories, and displays a much stronger U-shape for the effect of the minimum to median wage
ratio on the property crime rate. Table 13 shows that the U-shape is preserved with the inclusion of
both linear and quadratic time trends at the national and state level. Finally, Table 14 and Table 15
show that the U-shape is also revealed when the effect of the minimum to median wage ratio on the
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Table 11: Significance of Coefficients
Test of Coefficient on Quintile
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2 = 3 3 = 4 4 = 5 2 = 3 = 4 = 5
Property Crimes
F-stat: OLS 66.39 27.17 9.13 50.16
p-value: OLS 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000
F-stat: IV 94.81 14.77 2.38 60.73
p-value: IV 0.000 0.000 0.122 0.000
Burglary
F-stat: OLS 6.56 33.30 16.77 30.21
p-value: OLS 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-stat: IV 13.59 30.04 13.31 24.84
p-value: IV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Larceny
F-stat: OLS 11.46 1.47 5.57 5.97
p-value: OLS 0.001 0.225 0.018 0.001
F-stat: IV 25.11 5.28 2.19 9.34
p-value: IV 0.000 0.022 0.140 0.000
Motor Vehicle Theft
F-stat: OLS 17.75 32.73 3.87 34.92
p-value: OLS 0.000 0.000 0.049 0.000
F-stat: IV 23.91 12.64 0.23 26.26
p-value: IV 0.000 0.000 0.6319 0.000
Robbery
F-stat: OLS 5.51 1.39 21.58 9.12
p-value: OLS 0.019 0.238 0.000 0.000
F-stat: IV 9.92 1.98 9.15 8.73
p-value: IV 0.002 0.159 0.003 0.000
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Figure 11: Regression Coefficients
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crime rate is parameterized using a quadratic function.
7 Welfare
Since the model is stationary, the welfare analysis in this section will consider the long term outcomes
of a minimum wage. The workers in the model can be in one of five states at any given point in time:
unemployed and committing crimes (uc), unemployed and not committing crimes (unc), employed
and committing crimes (ec), employed and not committing crimes (enc), or in prison (p). Assuming
the minimum wage is the only policy instrument available to the social planner, the planner wishes to
maximize the following objective function:
W(m) = unc(m)V¯unc(m) + uc(m)V¯uc(m) + enc(m)V¯enc(m)
+ ec(m)V¯ec(m) + p(m)V¯p(m)
where i(m) is the size of the set of workers in state i ∈ {uc, unc, ec, enc, p} and V¯i is the average welfare
level in state i, expressions for V¯i(m) can be found in the Appendix, section A.3.
The top panel of Figure 12 plots welfare for different levels of the minimum wage. The figure
reveals that welfare is maximized at a $4.30 minimum wage, which corresponds to a minimum to
median wage ratio of 0.865, see the bottom panel of Figure 12. The welfare maximizing minimum
wage is different to the crime minimizing minimum wage because the minimum wage affects aggregate
welfare through changes in the unemployment rate, expected wages and crime. Over the range of
minimumwages for which crime is decreasing in the minimumwage, an increase in the minimumwage
increases welfare through increases in expected wages and decreases in crime, and decreases welfare
only through increases in the unemployment probability. For larger minimum wages, in the range over
which crime is increasing, an increase in the minimum wage increases welfare only through increases
in expected wages and decreases welfare by increasing the crime rate and increasing the unemployment
probability. The welfare maximizing minimum wage, $4.30, implies a monthly crime rate of 0.07
crimes per person.
Figure 13 plots the same welfare function for the model without crime (µe = 0, µu = 0, χ = 0)15.
The welfare maximizing minimum wage in this case is $3, which corresponds to a minimum to median
wage ratio of 0.7. The model does not consider the effect of a minimum wage on crime; therefore,
15Themodel without crime was recalibrated to match the unemployment rate, job finding rate, minimumwage to median wage
ratio and the median wage to 75th percentile wage ratio. All parameters in Table 2 remain the same. The job destruction rate
and parameters of the ability distribution in Table 3 remain the same. The estimated mean and variance of the job productivity
distribution, the offer arrival rate, and flow unemployment utility are: µˆλ = 0.8111, σˆλ = 0.535, µˆj = 3.958, and bˆ = −28.723.
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Figure 12: Welfare
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welfare is maximized at a lower minimum wage. In this case, the welfare increases from a decreasing
crime rate are ignored. If policymakers ignore the effects of changes in the minimum wage on crime,
choosing the welfare maximizing minimum wage, $3, implies a monthly crime rate of 0.11 crimes per
person, 57% higher than when considering the effects of the minimum wage on crime.
8 Conclusion
Theminimumwage has been discussed extensively around the country, leadingmany states and cities to
increases minimum wages by real amounts that we have not seen in the past. The increases are targeted
to improve labor market condition primarily for young and unskilled workers; however, increasing
the minimum wage may have unforeseen effects on these workers’ decisions to commit crimes. I
have shown that the relationship between the aggregate crime rate and the minimum wage is U-shaped
because of two opposing effects: the wage effect and the unemployment effect. Which effect dominates,
and ultimately how the aggregate crime rate will change depends on how much the minimum wage
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Figure 13: Welfare Without Crime
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increases. The calibrated model, as well as the empirical evidence from county level crime rates shows
that the crime rate is minimized when the minimum wage is 0.91 of the median wage of 16 to 19 year
olds. However, the crime minimizing minimum wage is not the welfare maximizing minimum wage,
since theminimumwage not only effects crime, but all labor market outcomes. The welfare maximizing
minimum to median wage ratio is 0.87. If policymakers abstract from the effect of a minimum wage
on crime, the welfare maximizing minimum to median wage ratio is 0.7.
The median nominal wage of all 16 to 19 year old across the United Stated in 2018 was $10. The
model implies that the crime minimizing nominal minimum wage is $9.10 and the welfare maximizing
nominal minimum wage is $8.70 in 2018. Both values are above the current nominal federal minimum
wage of $7.25, suggesting that when taking changes in crime into consideration, a federal increase in
the minimum wage may be welfare improving.
The goal of this paper is to establish the relationship between the minimumwage and the crime rate,
and quantify the effects. Many cities across the country have recently passed or proposed legislation
that moves to increase the minimum wage well above any threshold found in this paper, notably Seattle,
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New York City and California have moved to push the floor to $15 per hour. These increases would
surely lead to minimum to median wage ratios for young and uneducated workers well above not only
the welfare maximizing levels, but also the crime minimizing levels. As the discussion about the
minimum wage and its effects on the labor market continues, it is my hope that policymakers use the
ideas presented in this paper and consider the consequences on crime.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs
Proposition 2.1 If a ≥ a∗ then φe(a, λ) = 0 for all λ ≥ λR(a). Where λR(a) is the workers reservation
job productivity defined as Ve(λR(a), a) = Vu(a).
Proof. If a ≥ a∗ then Vu(a) > Vu(a)∗, thus φu(a) = 0. From Equation 3 this implies g + piVp(a) ≤
piVu(a). The definition of λR(a) implies that g + piVp(a) ≤ piVe(λR(a), a). Since Equation 6 is strictly
increasing in λ it must be the case that g+piVp(a) ≤ piVe(λ, a) for all λ ≥ λR(a). Thus from Equation 4,
φe(a, λ) = 0 for all λ ≥ λR(a). □
Proposition 2.2 If (r + δ)/µepi ≤ (1 − β)/β then,
a. If φu(a) = 0 then for all λ ≥ λR(a) the worker accepts the job and φe(a,w(a, λ)) = 0.
b. If φu(a) = 1 then for all λR(a) ≤ λ ≤ λD1(a) the worker accepts the job and φe(a,w(a, λ)) = 1.
c. If φu(a) = 1 then for all λ ≥ λD1(a) the worker accepts the job and φe(a,w(a, λ)) = 0.
Proof.
a. If φu(a) = 0 then Vu(a) ≥ Vu(a)∗, therefore the wage offered to the worker is
w(a, λ) = βaλ + (1 − β)wR(a).
If λ > λR(a) = wR(a)/a then w(a, λ) > βaλR(a) + (1 − β)wR(a) = wR(a) since w(a, λ) is
increasing in λ. Then Ve(w(a, λ), a) > Vu(a) since Ve(w, a) is increasing in w. Therefore
the worker accepts the job. By Proposition 2.1, the worker forgoes crime opportunities while
employed, i.e. φe(a,w(a, λ)) = 0.
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b. If φu(a) = 1 then Vu(a) < Vu(a)∗ and the wage function is given by Equation 25. If λR(a) < λ <
wC(a)/a then the wage is given by:
w(a, λ) = βaλ + (1 − β)wR(a)
Since w(a, λ) is increasing in λ,
βaλR(a) + (1 − β)wR(a) < w(a, λ) < βwC(a) + (1 − β)wR(a)
Plugging in for λR(a) = wR(a)/a and simplifying:
wR(a) < w(a, λ) < βwC(a) + (1 − β)wR(a)
Since wR(a) < wC(a) we get
wR(a) < w(a, λ) < wC(a)
If wC(a)/a < λ < λD1(a) then the wage is
w(λ, a) = β(r + δ + µepi)[aλ − (χL + rVu(a))]
r + δ
+ wR(a).
Plugging in wC(a)/a,
w(wC(a)/a, a) = β(r + δ + µepi)[wC(a) − (χL + rVu(a))]r + δ + wR(a)
=
β(r + δ + µepi)r[Vu(a)∗ − Vu(a)]
(r + γ) + wR(a)
> wR(a)
since Vu(a) < Vu(a)∗. Plugging in Equation 24 for λD1(a),
w(λD1(a), a) = β(r + δ + µepi)wC(a) + µepiwR(a)
µepi + β(r + δ + µepi) −
µepir(Vu(a)∗ − Vu(a))
[µepi + β(r + δ + µepi)](r + δ)(r + γ)
(47)
Now assume for contradiction that the right hand side of Equation 47 is greater than the crime
reservation wage, wC(a), then after some algebra we get:
−(r + δ)(r + γ)µe
[
g + pi
(
z − rVu(a)
(r + γ)
)]
− r((r + δ)2 + µepi)(Vu(a)∗ − Vu(a)) > 0
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Since theworker commits crimeswhile unemployed,Vu(a) < Vu(a)∗ and µe
[
g+pi
(
z−rVu (a)
(r+γ)
)]
> 0,
therefore we get a contradiction. So it must be the case that w(λD1(a), a) < wC(a). Since the
wage is larger than the reservation wage the worker accepts the job and since the wage is less than
the crime reservation wage, the worker commits crimes on the job when given the opportunity,
i.e. φe(a,w(a, λ)) = 1.
c. If φu(a) = 1 then Vu(a) < Vu(a)∗ and the wage function is given by Equation 25. If λ > λD1(a)
then there are two possible wage equations. First if λD1(a) < λ < λD2(a) then the wage is equal to
the crime reservation wage, wC(a). In this case the worker accepts the job since wR(a) < wC(a)
and forgoes crime opportunities since his wage is equal to the crime reservation wage. Second if
λ > λD2(a) then his wage is given by
w(a, λ) = βaλ + (1 − β)wC(a).
Since w(a, λ) is increasing in λ:
w(a, λ) > βaλD2(a) + (1 − β)wC(a).
Plugging in for λD2(a) given by Equation 13 and simplifying:
w(a, λ) > β(r + δ)[wC(a) − wR(a)]
µepi
+ wC(a).
Since wR(a) < wC(a) it must be the case that w(a, λ) > wC(a). So the worker accepts the job and
forgoes crime opportunities while employed, i.e. φ(a,w(a, λ)) = 0.
□
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A.2 Steady State Distributions
Equating the flows from Figure 4 gives the following steady state distributions:
u(a) =

δγ(µepi + δ)
Ω(a) if a < a
∗
δ
µjB(a) + δ if b ≥ b
∗
(48)
enc(a) =

µjA(a)γ(µepi + δ)
Ω(a) if a < a
∗
µjB(a)
µjB(a) + δ if a ≥ a
∗
(49)
ec(a) =

δγµjD(a)
Ω(a) if a < a
∗
0 if a ≥ a∗
(50)
p(a) =

δpi[µu(µepi + δ) + µeµjD(a)]
Ω(a) if a < a
∗
0 if a ≥ a∗
(51)
where Ω(a) = (µepi + δ)[δ(µupi + γ) + γµjA(a)] + δµjD(a)(µupi + γ).
A.3 Welfare
The average values V¯i for i ∈ {uc, unc, ec, enc, p} are defined as:
V¯uc =
∫ a∗
V(a)dF(a)F(a∗) (52)
V¯unc =
∫
a∗
Vu(a) dF(a)1 − F(a∗) (53)
V¯p =
∫ a∗
Vp(a)dF(a)F(a∗) (54)
V¯ec =
∫ a∗
Eλ
[
Ve(a, λ)|φe(a, λ = 1)
] dF(a)
F(a∗) (55)
V¯enc =
∫ a∗
Eλ
[
Ve(a, λ)|φe(a, λ = 0)
]
dF(a) +
∫
a∗
Eλ
[
Ve(a, λ)
]
dF(a) (56)
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A.4 Data
A.4.1 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997
The sample is restricted to individuals who are between the ages of 16 and 19 in 1998. Employment
status in the NLSY97 is reported in weekly arrays; employment status consists of an employer ID if
employed and one of several categories, including unemployed, if not associated with an employer.
First employment status is recoded to equal 1 if associated with an employer in a given week and 0
if unemployed, all other categories are coded as NA’s. Weekly employment status is aggregated to
a monthly status by taking the mean employment status over the month. Labor force participation
status for 1998 is calculated as the sum of months that an individual is either working or unemployed.
Individuals who participate in the labor force for less than 6 months per year are dropped from the
sample.
Individuals report their usual weekly hours and an hourly wage for up to nine jobs worked between
interview periods. Usual weekly hours from only the first job are used to calculate the average weekly
hours worked in the sample. Average hourly wage for each individual is calculated as the weighted
average of hourly wages reported for each job; the weights are the fraction of hours worked at each job.
Individuals with an average hourly wage less than the minimum wage in 1998, $5.15, are dropped from
the sample.
At each interview, individuals are asked if they have committed a crime since their last interview;
specifically, they are asked if they have stolen something worth more than $50 or have committed any
other property crime such as fencing, receiving, possessing or selling stolen property, and if so, how
many times. The responses to the frequency of crime are top coded at 99. Nine top coded individuals
are dropped from the sample, corresponding to about 0.1% of the sample. The aggregate yearly crime
rate for the sample is constructed as the sum of all times individuals stole more the $50 and committed
other property crimes divided by the number of individuals in the final sample (2, 356). The monthly
crime rate is the yearly crime rate divided by 12.
The job finding rate is calculated as the average number of transitions from unemployment to
employment, without exiting the labor force in any two consecutive months over all individuals over the
12 months in 1998. Similarly, the job destruction rate is calculated as the average number of transitions
from employment to unemployment in any two consecutive months over all individuals and months in
1998.
During round 1, individuals participated in the administration of the computer-adaptive form of the
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (CAT-ASVAB), which measures the respondents abil-
ity in 12 categories: arithmetic reasoning, electronics information, numerical operations, assembling
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objects, general science paragraph comprehension, auto information, mathematics knowledge, shop in-
formation, coding speed, mechanical comprehension, and word knowledge. An aggregated measure of
ability is constructed for each individual as the sum of their scores in the arithmetic reasoning, paragraph
comprehension and word knowledge categories. Sampling weights are used in all calculations.
A.4.2 Uniform Crime Reports
The county level data from the Uniform Crime Reports come from the National Archive of Criminal
Justice Data16. The data include counts of arrests and offenses of Part I offenses (murder, rape, robbery,
assault, burglary, larceny, auto theft, and arson) and Part II offenses (forgery, fraud, embezzlement,
vandalism, weapons violations, sex offenses, drug and alcohol abuse violations, gambling, vagrancy,
curfew violations, and runaways) at the county level. The crime rate for each county is calculated as the
number of offenses for each category in each county divided by the population of each county divided
by 100, 000. The property crime rate in each county is calculated as the sum of all burglaries, larcenies
and motor vehicle thefts divided by the population, divided by 100, 000.
A.4.3 County Demographics and Minimum to Median Wage Ratios
The county level demographic data come from the Survey of Epidemiology and End Results (SEER)
that provides estimates of the total population, and estimates of the population by 19 age groups, sex
and 3 race groups, white, black and other. The age groups are aggregate to 6 groups: 0 to 14, 15 to 24,
25 to 39, 40 to 59, 60 to 79 and 80 plus. Data on the poverty rate and average household income of
each county come from the Census’ Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates.
The minimum to median wage ratios are calculated at the state level using data from the Current
Populations Outgoing Rotation Groups from 1995 to 2014. The data come from the National Bureau
of Economic Research17. The sample is restricted to individuals between the ages of 16 and 19. The
hourly wages are calculated as reported hourly wage for hourly wage workers and weekly wages divided
by usual hours worked per week for individuals who report not working as hourly wage workers. The
binding minimum wage in each state in each year is calculated as the maximum of the state and federal
minimum wage.
16U.S. Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM DATA [UNITED
STATES]: COUNTY-LEVEL DETAILED ARREST AND OFFENSE DATA, 1995-2014. ICPSR ed. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research [producer and distributor].
17http://www.nber.org/cps/
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A.5 Simulations
A.5.1 Panel Data Set
This data set is constructed by simulating data for 1,000 “individuals" at each unique realization of the
real binding minimum wage. The real binding minimum wage is the maximum of the state and federal
minimum wage in 1998 dollars; from 1990 to 2011 there were 204 unique levels of the real binding
minimum wage across states in the US. An individual in this simulation consists of a single draw from
the estimated ability distribution, F(µˆa, σˆa).
For each of the 204 minimum wages, the probability of unemployment, employment and prison for
each worker is calculated. To simulate the worker’s expected wage, 50 realizations from the estimated
productivity distribution, G(µˆλ, σˆλ), are drawn. For each realization the wage is calculated and the
expected wage for each individual at each minimum wage is calculated as the mean wage across
realizations of job productivities. This process produces the final data set, which includes an expected
wage and unemployment probability for each of the 1,000 individuals at each unique minimum wage.
A.5.2 Aggregate Data Set
The aggregate data set consists of observations of the average unemployment probability and average
expected wage of all individuals in the economy. The aggregate economy consists of 1,000 individuals
and is simulated at every observed real binding minimum wage from 1990 to 2011; there were 1,122
observed real binding minimum wages, 50 states and Washington D.C. times 22 years. For each
minimum wage, 1,000 individuals are drawn from the estimated ability distribution, F(µˆλ, σˆλ). For
each individual, the probability of unemployment and expected wage are calculated. The expected
wage for each individual is calculated as the average wage resulting from 100 draws from the estimated
job productivity distribution. The aggregate unemployment probability and aggregate expected wage
is calculated as the weighed average across individuals; the weights are the estimated probability of
observing each type of individual, f (a| µˆλ, σˆλ).
A.6 Robustness
As a robustness check for the result of the U-shaped relationship between the minimum to median wage
ratio on the crime rate, Table 12 gives the estimated coefficients from Equation 46 without the lagged
dependent variable. The results are consistent with those found when including the lagged dependent
variable in both the OLS and IV specifications.
The lagged dependent variable is included in the main specifications to control for county level time
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Table 12: Non-Parametric Specification without Lagged Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Property Burglary Larceny Motor Vehicle RobberyCrimes Theft
Quintile of
Min-to-Median Ratio
2nd. -15.83 7.659 8.089 -10.47∗∗∗ 0.474
(11.15) (3.927) (7.286) (1.536) (0.487)
3rd. -127.3∗∗∗ -8.751∗ -19.17∗ -17.66∗∗∗ -2.438∗∗∗
(13.60) (3.833) (9.454) (1.897) (0.518)
4rd. -177.2∗∗∗ 14.00∗∗∗ -10.24 -28.85∗∗∗ -2.163∗∗∗
(16.19) (4.203) (11.19) (2.045) (0.586)
5th. -116.0∗∗∗ 24.37∗∗∗ 12.68 -24.16∗∗∗ -0.441
(15.62) (4.211) (11.01) (2.029) (0.538)
N 54,780 54,780 54,780 54,780 54,780
Standard errors clustered at the county level. All specifications include demographic controls, county
fixed effects, household income and poverty levels. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
varying unobservables. As a robustness check for the dependence of controlling for county level time
varying unobservables I re-estimate Equation 46 and replace the lagged dependent variable with four
different time trends: (1) aggregate linear time trend, (2) aggregate quadratic time trend, (3) state level
linear time trends, (4) state level quadratic time trends. Table 13 shows that the U-shaped relationship
between the minimum to median wage ratio and the crime rate is robust to the inclusion of more
aggregated trends.
As a final robustness check, I specify a parametric relationship between the minimum to median
wage ratio and the crime rate:
crimect = β1 + β2MMst + β3MM2st + β3Xct + β4crimect−1 + γc + εct (57)
Specifying a quadratic relationship between the minimum to median wage ratio and the crime rate is
more restrictive on the data than the non parametric relationship in the main specifications since it can
only deliver one of three outcomes - no relationship, a linear relationship or a quadratic relationship
- whereas the nonparametric specification can deliver any result. Table 14 gives the estimates on the
linear and squared term of the minimum to median wage ratio. The table shows a U-shaped relationship
between the minimum to median wage ratio and the burglary, motor vehicle and robbery crime rates
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Table 13: Inclusion of Time Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Property Property Property Property
Crimes Crimes Crimes Crimes
Quintile of
Min-to-Median Ratio
2nd. -27.27∗ -20.75 -37.38∗∗∗ -21.88∗
(11.11) (11.00) (10.98) (10.31)
3rd. -116.9∗∗∗ -106.1∗∗∗ -131.5∗∗∗ -86.64∗∗∗
(13.54) (13.08) (13.16) (11.90)
4th. -133.6∗∗∗ -119.8∗∗∗ -168.2∗∗∗ -116.6∗∗∗
(15.33) (14.27) (13.83) (12.15)
5th. -96.97∗∗∗ -86.95∗∗∗ -114.0∗∗∗ -74.12∗∗∗
(15.33) (14.42) (14.32) (12.93)
Linear Time Trend ✓
Quadratic Time Trend ✓
State Level Linear Time Trend ✓
State Level Quadratic Time Trend ✓
N 54,780 54,780 54,780 54,780
Standard errors clustered at the county level. All specifications include demographic controls, county
fixed effects, household income and poverty levels. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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since the squared term is positive and significant. The squared term on the total property crime rate
is significant at the 15% level. Table 15 gives the estimated coefficients when not including a lagged
dependent variable. The table shows a U-shaped relationship for all crime categories except the larceny
crime rate.
Table 14: Robustness Check: Parametric Specification with Lagged Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Property Burglary Larceny Motor Vehicle RobberyCrimes Theft
MM -1442.0∗ -1447.1∗∗∗ -552.4 -327.5∗∗∗ -97.67∗∗∗
(635.7) (198.7) (422.5) (83.00) (26.73)
MM2 541.5 904.8∗∗∗ 319.9 152.9∗∗ 55.52∗∗∗
(376.0) (118.4) (249.7) (48.55) (15.76)
N 51,418 51,418 51,418 51,418 51,418
Standard errors clustered at the county level. All specifications include demographic
controls, county fixed effects, household income, poverty levels and a lagged dependent
variable. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 15: Robustness Check: Parametric Specification without Lagged Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Property Burglary Larceny Motor Vehicle RobberyCrimes Theft
MM -4658.2∗∗∗ -1420.3∗∗∗ -1168.6 -702.1∗∗∗ -94.17∗∗
(974.2) (279.1) (680.6) (141.1) (35.56)
MM2 2372.8∗∗∗ 898.3∗∗∗ 703.5 345.4∗∗∗ 53.38∗
(572.1) (167.1) (399.6) (82.06) (21.15)
N 54,780 54,780 54,780 54,780 54,780
Standard errors clustered at the county level. All specifications include demographic
controls, county fixed effects, household income and poverty levels. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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